⏑−⏑⏑¦⏑−−−¦¦−⏑−⏑¦⏑−⏑−
athājña iti siddho vaḥ
kalpitena kim ātmanā |
⏑−−−¦⏑−−−¦¦⏑−−−¦⏑−⏑−
vināpi
hy ātmanājñānaṁ prasiddhaṁ kāṣṭha-kuḍyavat ||
12.81
12.81
Or else, if it's your
conclusion that he is unknowing,
Then what is the point
of inventing a soul?
For even without a
soul, not knowing is well established,
For even without a
soul, the act of knowing is accomplished,
For when the self is
truly absent, realization is realized,
As in the case of a log
or a wall.
COMMENT:
The ghost-busting gist
of the bodhisattva's words is conveyed so clearly in the 2nd
pāda of today's verse that it comes through the translations of each
of the four professors:
EBC: then of what use
to you is this imagined soul?
EHJ: what then is the
use of inventing the existence of a soul?
JB: what then is the
use of inventing the existence of a soul?
PO: then why do you
invent a soul?
What the bodhisattva
meant by knowing or not knowing or realizing (jñānam/ajñānam/ājñānam) in the 3rd pāda,
however, and by being like a log or a wall (kāṣṭha-kuḍyavat)
in the 4th
pāda, is open to investigation.
In the paper by
Johaness Bronkhurst discussed in earlier posts, JB states his case
for understanding that the bodhisattva in yesterday's verse and today's
verse is directing criticism specifically against Vaiśeṣika
teaching:
Once again, this
criticism has not much force if directed against something like
classical Sāṁkhya, which conceives of the consciousness of the
soul as being essentially without object. Vaiśeṣika, on the other
hand, thinks of consciousness as essentially object-oriented. What is
more, consciousness or knowledge (buddhi) is, in Vaiśeṣika, a
quality (guṇa) of the soul which does not remain in the state of
liberation. The liberated soul, and consequently the soul in and by
itself, is unconscious, and therefore like a log or like a wall.
If JB's speculation is
well-founded, then, the true meaning of today's verse cannot fully be
understood without some knowledge of
Vaiśeṣika philosophy.
In
that case modern-day professors in Buddhist studies departments
around the world are able to understand today's verse, thanks to what
“Bronkhurst has shown”
(PO's words).
But in that case the 6th
Zen patriarch in China – the one who, as mentioned yesterday, said
that the Flower of Dharma turns the Flower of Dharma – would not
have had a cat in hell's chance of understanding today's verse,
because he was, before becoming a monk, an illiterate wood-cutter.
One suspects that he never ceased being more interested in logs
than in ideas about “the liberated soul.” Even after entering the
monastery, the story goes, Hui-neng liked the non-intellectual work
of pounding rice with a big wooden
pestle. The niceties of
Vaiśeṣika philosophy would have been totally wasted on him.
At
the same time, as the 6th
Zen patriarch in China, Hui-neng (Japanese: Daikan Eno) was
celebrated in China for his excellent understanding of the intention
in coming from India of Bodhidharma, who famously spent the best part
of nine years facing a wall.
Moreover, Hui-neng's student, known in China as “the National
Master,” because he was the Emperor's teacher, when he was asked,
“What is the mind of eternal buddhas?,”
famously replied “Fences, walls,
tiles and pebbles.”
So much for logs and
walls. What about knowing and not knowing?
In the 3rd pāda ātmanājñānam can be read as the compound ātmanā
+ ajñānam (not knowing), but also as the two words ātmanā and jñānam (knowing),
or even as the compound ātmanā + ājñānam (realizing).
The
Chinese translator seems to have read jñānam (知; knowing) in the 3rd
pāda; hence his translation
離我而有知
[When]
the I is absent and knowing exists,
我即同木石
The
I is just the same as wood and stone.
Evidently
the Tibetan translator also read jñānam, leading EHJ to note:
I have not thought
it necessary to follow [the Chinese and Tibetan translations] in the
second line, as it is a question, not of reading, but of division of
words, and the first line makes ajñānam certain in the second.
Thus EHJ followed EBC
in reading ajñānam, and JB and PO also followed suit.
EBC translated ajñānam
“the absence of knowledge”; EHJ as “the quality of
not-knowing”; JB as “the feature of not knowing”; and PO as
“non-knowing.”
So EHJ asserted that
ajñānam (not knowing) – as opposed to jñānam (knowing), or
ājñānam (realizing) – was certain. But I am not so sure.
In the
final analysis, under whom should we study knowing and not knowing?
Under the Chinese and Tibetan translators? Under EHJ? Or under
Bodhidharma, who, when the Emperor asked him who the hell he thought
he was, is said to have replied, pithily, “Dunno!”
vināpi hy ātmanājñānaṁ
prasiddhaṁ kāṣṭha-kuḍyavat
For even without a
soul, not knowing (ajñānam)
is well established, as in the state of
a log or a wall.
vināpi hy ātmanā
jñānaṁ prasiddhaṁ kāṣṭha-kuḍyavat
For even without a
soul, the act of knowing (jñānam)
is accomplished, as in [knowing]
a log or a wall.
vināpi hy ātmanājñānaṁ
prasiddhaṁ kāṣṭha-kuḍyavat
For in the true absence
of self, the act of realizing (ājñānam)
is realized, as in the
case of a log or a wall.
Which translation is
best?
I honestly do not know.
Either that, or I have
established beyond all reasonable doubt that Aśvaghoṣa was a
master of irony.
Just as a log or a wall
is 不会, “not knowing,”
so ultimately does Aśvaghoṣa leave the reader – in more ways
than one.
VOCABULARY
atha:
ind. or else
ajñaḥ
(nom. sg. m.): mfn. unknowing
iti:
“....,” thus
siddhaḥ
(nom. sg. m.): mfn. accomplished ; admitted to be true or right ,
established , settled , proved
vaḥ
(gen. pl.): your
kalpitena
(inst. sg. m.) mfn. made , fabricated , artificial ; composed ,
invented ; assumed, supposed
kim:
[with inst.] what is the use of?
ātmanā
(inst. sg.): m. the soul
vinā:
ind. without (followed by inst.)
api: even; (emphatic) indeed, truly
hi:
for
ātmanā
(inst. sg.): m. the soul
jñānam:
(nom. sg.): n. the act of knowing
ajñānam
(nom. sg.): n. not knowing, ignorance
ā-jñānam
(nom. sg.): n. noticing , perceiving ; the act of realizing
ā-
√ jñā: to mind , perceive , notice , understand
prasiddham
(nom. sg. n.): mfn. brought about , accomplished ; well known ,
notorious , celebrated
kāṣṭha-kuḍyavat:
ind. like
kāṣṭha:
n. a piece of wood or timber , stick
kuḍya:
n. a wall
若言無知者 我則無所用
離我而有知 我即同木石
離我而有知 我即同木石
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