⏑−⏑−¦−⏑⏑¦−⏑−⏑−¦¦⏑−⏑−¦−⏑⏑¦−⏑−⏑− Vaṁśastha
na
me kṣamaṁ saṁśaya-jaṁ hi
darśanaṁ grahītum-avyakta-paras-parāhatam
|
⏑−⏑−¦−⏑⏑¦−⏑−⏑−¦¦⏑−⏑−¦−⏑⏑¦−⏑−⏑−
budhaḥ
para-pratyayato
hi ko vrajej-jano 'ndhakāre 'ndha ivāndha-deśikaḥ || 9.74
9.74
For it would ill befit
me to accept a worldview born of doubt,
Unintelligible and
beset with internal contradictions.
For what wise person
would proceed
on the grounds of
another person's grounds –
Like a blind man in the
darkness, whose guide is blind?
COMMENT:
I am not sure whether
Aśvaghoṣa intended today's verse to be read with an ironic
subtext, or not. In the end I decided that, whether Aśvaghoṣa intended one or not, there is an ironic subtext which I find too appealing to resist.
When I sit in lotus in
the morning, I am not doing something instinctive. I did not evolve
to sit in lotus. Sitting with legs crossed in the full lotus posture
is a contrivance of human consciousness. Neither is it something I
contrived to do by myself. When I sit in lotus I am following in a yoga-tradition, as even the
Buddha himself followed in a yoga-tradition, sitting on the grounds of
another person's grounds.
At the same time it is
up to me to make this practice into my own possession. That means not
proceeding on the grounds of another person's belief, and not
proceeding even on the grounds of my own belief. It means proceeding
on the grounds of something more real than belief – something
called in Sanskrit prajñā, really knowing.
At the end of my
sitting just now, I dedicated any merit there was in the practice towards the buddhas in the ten directions and three times, on whose grounds I
have just proceeded; and at the same time towards the
mahā-prajñā-pāramitā, the knowing which totally transcends anybody's belief.
Thus today's verse
means something to me if it is read not with any ironic subtext, but
simply as a statement of the bodhisattva's determination to discover
the truth for himself, and of his skeptical attitude towards Brahmanical
beliefs:
9.74
For it would ill befit
me to accept a doctrine born of doubt,
An undeveloped doctrine
beset with internal contradictions.
For what wise person
would proceed
on the grounds of
another person's belief –
Like a blind man in the
darkness, whose guide is blind.
At the same time, if we
take para-pratyayataḥ √vraj, "proceeding on the grounds of another
person's grounds," as an ironic expression of sitting-meditation, that
opens up an ironic subtext that could be running through the whole
verse:
9.74
For it would ill befit
me to accept a worldview born of doubt,
Unintelligible and
beset with internal contradictions.
For what wise person
would proceed
on the grounds of
another person's grounds –
Like a blind man in the
darkness, whose guide is blind?
The verse hinges, then,
on how we understand pratyaya-taḥ in the 3rd pāda. If
we take the first definition of pratyaya given in the dictionary,
belief, then para (the other) + pratyaya (belief) + taḥ
(ablative suffix) is translated straightforwardly enough as “on the
grounds of another person's belief.”
Grammatically, however,
pratyaya is thought to be derived from prati-√i (prati = towards,
aya = going). So English translations that best reflect this
derivation might be “approach” or “motive.”
“Investigation
of Pratyaya” (pratyaya-parīkṣā) is the title of the 1st
canto of Nāgārjuna's Concise Statement, from Bang in the Middle, of
the Fundamental (Mūla-madhyamaka-kārikā). In the opening verses of
that work, Nāgārjuna asserts that there are four pratyaya, and not
a fifth.
Exactly
what Nāgārjuna meant by pratyaya remains for me to investigate if
and when I get to translating MMK. But nothing is more sure than that
Nāgārjuna, the 14th Zen patriarch, was well familiar
with the use by Aśvaghoṣa, the 12th Zen patriarch, of
the term pratyaya. Nāgārjuna would have read the term pratyaya in
today's verse and in the following verses from Saundara-nanda.
saṃkleśa-pakṣo dvividhaś-ca dṛṣṭas-tathā dvikalpo vyavadāna-pakṣaḥ /
There are
understood to be two aspects to defilement;
correspondingly,
there are two approaches to purification:
ātmāśrayo
hetu-balādhikasya bāhyāśrayaḥ pratyaya-gauravasya //
5.16 //
In one
with stronger motivation from within, there is self-reliance;
in one
who assigns weight to conditions, there is outer-dependence.
ayatnato
hetu-balādhikas-tu nirmucyate ghaṭṭita-mātra eva /
The one
who is more strongly self-motivated loosens ties
without
even trying, on receipt of the slightest stimulus;
yatnena tu
pratyaya-neya-buddhir-vimokṣam-āpnoti parāśrayeṇa //
5.17 //
Whereas
the one whose mind is led by circumstances struggles to find
freedom,
because of
his dependence on others.
nandaḥ
sa ca pratyaya-neya-cetā yaṃ śiśriye tan-maya-tām avāpa
/
And Nanda,
whose mind was led by circumstances,
became
absorbed into whomever he depended on;
yasmād-imaṃ
tatra cakāra yatnaṃ taṃ sneha-paṅkān munir ujjihīrṣan //
5.18 //
The Sage,
therefore, made this effort in his case,
wishing to
lift him out of the mire of love.
mohātmikāyāṃ
manasaḥ pravṛttau sevyas-tv-idam-pratyayatā-vihāraḥ /
When
working of the mind is delusory,
one should appreciate the causality therein;
one should appreciate the causality therein;
mūḍhe
manasy-eṣa hi śānti-mārgo vāyv-ātmake snigdha ivopacāraḥ //
16.64 //
For this
is a path to peace when the mind is bewildered,
like
treating a wind condition with oil.
sambhārataḥ
pratyayataḥ svabhāvād-āsvādato doṣa-viśeṣataś-ca /
On the
grounds of their being held together,
their causality, and their inherent nature,
their causality, and their inherent nature,
on the
grounds of their flavour and their concrete imperfection,
athātmavān-niḥsaraṇātmataś-ca
dharmeṣu cakre vidhivat parīkṣām // 17.15 //
And on the
grounds of their tendency to spread out,
he who was
now contained in himself,
carried out a methodical investigation into things.
carried out a methodical investigation into things.
In these
verses from Saundara-nanda, the sense of conditionality or
causality is to the fore. But in the present context in
Buddha-carita, what the bodhisattva is negating –at least
ostensibly, on the surface – is belief.
Hence EBC translated
the 3rd pāda:
What wise man would go
by another's belief?
And PO similarly:
For what wise man would
follow another's belief...?
EHJ, however, was at
pains to retain the sense established in Saundarananda (especially in
SN Canto 5) of dependence on
conditions.
Hence
EHJ translated:
For what wise man would
go forward in dependence on another...?
EHJ added in a
footnote:
The prince's
rejection of para-pratyaya has doctrinal significance. It is only the
man of feeble faculties, in whom the roots of good are weak, who
depends on others; those like the prince, in whom the force working
for enlightenment is strong (note BC2.56 rūḍhamūle 'pi hetau),
act of themselves, as clearly put at SN5.15-18.
I think EHJ
may have been correct in intuiting that Aśvaghoṣa intended more by
pratyaya than initially meets the eye. At the same time, in wanting
to make the connection he wants to make to pratyaya as dependence
on conditions, EHJ has translated the 3rd pāda in a
way that seems somehow forced. The compound para-pratyaya-taḥ seems
to be asking to be translated simply as:
- by / on the grounds of (-taḥ)
- another person's / somebody else's (para-)
- pratyaya.
The central question
that remains, then, is how to translate pratyaya, whose definitions
in the MW dictionary include belief, assumption, ground, cause, co-operating cause.
Looking ahead to the
coming couple of verses, so far I do not see those verses as likely
candidates for concealing an ironic subtext. So perhaps I am barking
up the wrong tree.
But, for example, might
a worldview born of doubt – a way of seeing the world which is
transcendent and full of paradoxes – be the essence of the
transmission that Nāgārjuna received via Aśvaghoṣa?
Can we think that,
after Aśvaghoṣa caused the bodhisattva to ask, “Who would
proceed on the grounds of
another person's grounds, like a blind man in the darkness whose
guide is blind?”, Nāgārjuna, as it were, put his hand up and said
“I will have a try.”
I ask these questions
not knowing the answer to them, in which case there is nothing for it
but to carry on, like a blind man groping in the dark → groping for
the right direction.
A blind man cannot find
his own way through the darkness by relying on his non-existent
visual sense. Still less can he hope to go in the right direction by
relying on the non-existent visual sense of somebody else who is
blind. If he wishes to go in the right direction, the blind man
needs to rely on something other than his visual sense... like his
auditory sense, or his sense of touch, or his reason – or like the
knowledge and experience of his blind guide.
If his blind guide is a
buddha, the blind man might spend some time usefully investigating
the other blind man's pratyaya. He might ask his blind guide, for
example:
What do you mean by
pratyaya? Your beliefs? Your motives? Conditions? The grounds for your action?
Again, do you perhaps
have a map – maybe written in braille – that we can use as
grounds for going in the right direction?
Or are we ultimately
better off just blindly sitting here in lotus, allowing ourselves to be
directed by we know not what?
VOCABULARY
na:
not
me
(gen. sg.): of/for me
kṣamam
(acc. sg. n.). fit , appropriate , becoming , suitable , proper for
(gen.)
saṁśaya-jam
(acc. sg. n.): born of doubt
saṁśaya:
m. uncertainty , irresolution , hesitation , doubt
saṁga-śatam [EBC]
(acc. sg. n.): “which involves a hundred prepossessions”
saṁga: m. “coming
together”, conflict
śata: a hundred
hi:
for
darśanam
(acc. sg. n.): n. seeing , observing , looking , noticing ,
observation , perception ; n. inspection , examination ; n.
apprehension , judgement ; discernment , understanding , intellect ;
opinion ; view, doctrine , philosophical system ; n. the becoming
visible or known , presence ; n. a vision , dream
grahītum
= inf. grah: to grasp, take, accept
avyakta-paras-parāhatam
(acc. sg. n.): undeveloped and full of internal contradictions
a-vyakta:
mfn. undeveloped , not manifest , unapparent , indistinct , invisible
, imperceptible
vyakta:
mfn. adorned , embellished , beautiful ; caused to appear ,
manifested , apparent , visible , evident ; developed , evolved ;
distinct , intelligible ; perceptible by the senses (opp. to a-vyakta
, transcendental) ; n. (in sāṁkhya phil.) " the unevolved
(Evolver of all things) " , the primary germ of nature ,
primordial element or productive principle whence all the phenomena
of the material world are developed
paras-para:
mfn. each other, mutually
āhata:
mfn. struck , beaten , hit , hurt ; rendered null , destroyed ,
frustrated ; blunted ; uttered falsely ; repeated
budhaḥ
(nom. sg.): m. a wise or learned man , sage
para-pratyayataḥ:
on the grounds of another's assumption
pratyaya:
m. belief, firm conviction , trust , faith , assurance or certainty
of (gen. loc. or comp.); conception , assumption , notion , idea ;
ground , basis , motive or cause of anything ; (with Buddhists) a
co-operating cause ; the concurrent occasion of an event as
distinguished from its approximate cause
-taḥ:
(ablative suffix)
hi:
for
kaḥ
(nom. sg. m.): who?
vrajet
= 3rd pers. sg. optative vraj: to go, proceed
janaḥ
(nom. sg.): m. person, man
andha-kāre
(loc. sg.): mn. 'blind-maker' ; darkness
andhaḥ
(nom. sg. m. ): mfn. blind
iva:
like
andha-deśikaḥ
(nom. sg. m.): having a blind guide
deśika: mfn.
familiar with a place , a guide (lit. and fig.) ; m. a Guru or
spiritual teacher ; a traveller
世間猶豫論 展轉相傳習
無有眞實義 此則我不安
無有眞實義 此則我不安
明人別眞僞 信豈由他生
猶如生盲人 以盲人爲導
於夜大闇中 當復何所從
猶如生盲人 以盲人爲導
於夜大闇中 當復何所從